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Abstract: Canadians do not have a constitutional right to state-funded counsel for 
matters of civil law, unlike for matters of criminal law. This article examines the reasons 
for this and, more importantly, the significant barriers for establishing a general 
constitutional right to state-funded counsel for civil cases. Analysis in this article shows 
that the most significant barriers for establishing such a general constitutional right have 
been, and will likely continue to be, the courts‘ interpretation of the Constitution from the 
perspective of the Charter framers and their reluctance to impose a positive constitutional 
obligation on government that would dictate the allocation of public funds. 
 
 
As many observers have noted, ―access to justice is the essential foundation for our legal system 
to function‖ (McLachlin 2007: 4). Today‘s high legal costs, however, are impairing access to 
justice for many Canadians, with a routine three-day civil trial in Ontario costing about $60,000 
(Tyler 2007). In an effort to remedy the inadequacy of civil legal aid across Canada, the 
Canadian Bar Association (CBA) in 2005 launched a test case in British Columbia, The 
Canadian Bar Association v. HMTQ et al, 2006, to establish a constitutional right to civil legal 
aid. Although the case was dismissed by both the Supreme Court of British Columbia and the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal in 2007 on the basis that the CBA lacked public interest 
standing to launch such an action, support for the principles raised in the legal case remains.  
 
Presently, policy makers in Canada do not have a clear constitutional obligation to ensure 
that Canadians can access the justice system to enforce their legal rights.  Some argue that 
without legal aid, segments of the population are denied access to justice, as they are unable to 
take advantage of the protections and guarantees offered by the legal system as they could with 
legal counsel. However, like Dorothy and her friends who faithfully travelled the Yellow Brick 
Road in search of the Wizard of Oz whom they believed would give them what they desired, 
advocates for the right to state-funded counsel for civil law matters are taking a road paved with 
obstacles. Although their journey towards greater access to justice has yet to end, in turning to 
the courts to grant the constitutional right to state-funded counsel for civil cases, advocates are 
coming face to face with their most significant barrier, the courts themselves. The courts‘ 
interpretation of the Constitution from which arguments for state-funded counsel stem, and 
unwillingness to impose a positive constitutional obligation on government to allocate funds for 
civil cases, are the greatest obstacles for establishing a constitutional right to state-funded 
counsel for civil cases and will likely remain so.   
 
An analysis of court cases and reports on legal aid in recent years reveals legal, political, 
financial and practical barriers for expanding the right to state-funded counsel in civil cases. 
First, the argument to expand the right to state-funded counsel to more types of civil proceedings 
based on the Charter Section 7 right to ―security of the person‖ is restricted by the requirement 
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for state involvement in the proceeding and the courts‘ narrow interpretation of what type of 
state interference would constitute ―violation‖ of the ―security of the person‖ (Schmolka 2002: 
9E; Bala 2002: 68E). Second, it is difficult to produce empirical evidence to support the 
argument for state-funded counsel that claims that legal aid plans infringe women‘s right to 
equality under Section 15 of the Charter (McCallum 2002: 146E; New Brunswick Advisory 
Council on the Status of Women 2007: 20). Third, the argument to expand the right based on the 
claim that the absence of state-funded counsel discriminates against the poor, and thereby 
violates Section 15 of the Charter, is severely challenged by jurisprudence that does not 
recognize poverty as an analogous ground (Arvay 2002: 48E; McCallum 2002: 144E). Finally, 
the argument to expand the right to state-funded counsel based on the rule of law is limited by 
the courts‘ refusal to override the written Constitution by an unwritten constitutional principle 
(Mathen 2008: 201). Analysis in this article will demonstrate that the most significant barriers 
for establishing a general constitutional right to state-funded counsel for civil cases in Canada 
have been, and will likely continue to be, the courts‘ interpretation of the Constitution from the 
perspective of the Charter framers, and the courts‘ reluctance to impose a positive constitutional 
obligation on government that would dictate the allocation of public funds. 
 
The Constitutional Principles  
To understand the arguments for and against establishing a constitutional right to state-funded 
counsel, it is important to begin with an overview of the relevant constitutional principles. The 
arguments around the right to state-funded counsel are grounded primarily in the following five 
sections of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
1
: 
 
 Section 7: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to 
be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. 
 Section 11 (d): Any person charged with an offence has the right to be presumed innocent 
until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal. 
 Section 15: (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the 
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without 
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability. (2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has 
as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including 
those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, 
age or mental or physical disability. 
 Section 24 (1): Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been 
infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as 
the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances. 
 Section 32 (1): This Charter applies (a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in 
respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the 
Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and (b) to the legislature and government of each 
province in respect of all matters within the authority of the legislature of each province. 
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According to Section 32 (1), the Charter applies only to situations between individuals and the 
government and not to situations between individuals with each other (Saul 2006). 
 
In addition, the principle of the ―rule of law‖ is relevant to arguments surrounding 
expanding the right to state-funded counsel. The rule of law principle, contained in the preamble 
to the Constitution Act, 1982, is an unwritten constitutional principle that has been subject to 
different interpretations; however, ―the rule of law‖ is recognized by the courts as guaranteeing 
the supremacy of law, thereby protecting individuals from ―arbitrary state action.‖2 
 
Expanding the Right to State-Funded Legal Counsel  
Identifying the main actors in this issue provides insight into the legal reasoning and outcomes. 
The main actors include the three government branches (executive, legislative, judicial); legal aid 
agencies; interest groups for lawyers, the poor and women; and individuals from primarily 
middle-income and poor families. The cited cases are heard at the provinces‘ courts of appeal 
and supreme courts, and at the Supreme Court of Canada. New Brunswick (Minister of Health 
and Community Services) v. G.(J.), 1999, was the first case to recognize a right to state-funded 
counsel in a civil case. It is significant to the arguments around expanding the right to state-
funded counsel to more types of civil cases because it was decided by the Supreme Court. The 
fact that there were nine interveners in G.(J.), including the attorney general of three provinces 
and large associations representing the interests of lawyers, the poor and women (including the 
Canadian Bar Association, the Charter Committee on Poverty Issues, and the Women‘s Legal 
Education and Action Fund), might have had an impact on the Court‘s decision in favour of the 
appellant. As evident in the cited cases, the courts have hesitated to establish a general 
constitutional right to state-funded counsel that would interfere with the roles of the legislatures 
and executive branch in making laws and allocating public funds. For example, in P.D. v. British 
Columbia, 2010, the Supreme Court of British Columbia stated the following: 
 
[T]he court has no ability to expressly compel the expenditure of public funds to rectify a 
Charter violation .… I see nothing in the enactments of 1982 which … gave the courts 
the power to create or confer … a power in the Crown … to expend public funds .… I do 
not overlook s. 24(1) .… I cannot accept that the framers of the Charter intended that the 
courts should have the power … to subvert parliamentary control of the public purse 
(P.D. para. 96). 
 
 Also, as seen in Gosselin v. Québec (Attorney General), 2002, Christie v. British 
Columbia, 2005, and Boulter v. Nova Scotia Power Incorporation, 2009, all of which challenged 
government regulations (the Social Aid Regulation, the Social Service Tax Amendment Act, and 
the Public Utilities Act, respectively), the courts found no violation of Charter rights. The 
legitimacy of judges in striking down laws passed by democratically elected legislatures on the 
ground that they violate the Constitution is enhanced if judges can show that their reading of the 
Constitution is based not on their own personal views but on the intentions of the ―founding 
fathers‖ (Russell et al. 2008: 18). This, along with the courts‘ reluctance to interfere with the 
allocation of public funds, helps to explain the courts‘ literal approach to constitutional 
interpretation on the issue of the right to state-funded counsel. 
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 Examining the legal reasoning in the landmark cases from which a limited right to state-
funded counsel emerged is critical to understanding the limitations to the arguments for 
expanding the right. R. v. Rowbotham, 1988, is the first case to recognize a right to state-funded 
counsel in the criminal law context. In this case, the Ontario Court of Appeal found that the 
accused, who had been denied legal aid, did not have sufficient funds to pay counsel for a trial 
that was expected to last twelve months (Schmolka 2002a: 6). The court did not recognize a 
general constitutional right to state-funded counsel, stating ―those who framed the Charter did 
not expressly constitutionalize the right of an indigent accused to be provided with counsel, 
because they considered that, generally speaking, the provincial legal aid systems were adequate 
to provide counsel‖ (Rowbotham 61). However, the court unanimously ruled that ―in cases not 
falling within provincial legal aid plans,‖ Sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter require funded 
counsel to be provided if the accused wishes, but cannot afford, counsel and where counsel is 
essential to a fair trial (Ibid). 
 
It was not until G.(J.) that a right to state-funded counsel in civil cases was recognized. In 
G.(J.), the province‘s community services department asked the court to extend a temporary 
Crown wardship of three children for another six months (cited in Schmolka 2002a: 6). The 
mother, despite being at the lowest income level, was not eligible for legal aid to hire counsel to 
represent her in the custody proceeding because the province‘s legal aid plan only covered cases 
for the permanent removal of a child. The Supreme Court of Canada was unanimous in finding 
that the mother should have been provided with state-funded counsel based on the Section 7 right 
to ―security of the person‖; the Court stated that ―without the benefit of counsel, the appellant 
would not have been able to participate effectively at the hearing, creating an unacceptable risk 
of error in determining the children‘s best interests and thereby threatening to violate both the 
appellant‘s and her children‘s Section 7 right to security of the person‖ (G.(J.). para. 81). In 
determining the remedy for the Charter violation, the Supreme Court was careful not to interpret 
the Charter in a way that would deviate from the intentions of the framers, who rejected a clause 
to provide counsel, or in a way that would impose a positive obligation on government‘s 
allocation of limited resources:  
 
[T]he framers of the Charter consciously chose not to constitutionalize a right to state-
funded counsel under s. 10 .… [T]he following clause … was considered and rejected: 
(d) if without sufficient means to pay for counsel and if the interests of justice so require, 
to be provided with counsel .… In light of the language of s. 10 … and … that the 
framers of the Charter decided not to incorporate into s. 10 even a relatively limited 
substantive right to legal assistance … it would be a very big step for this Court to 
interpret the Charter in a manner which imposes a positive constitutional obligation on 
governments. The fact that such an obligation would almost certainly interfere with 
governments‘ allocation of limited resources by requiring them to expend public funds on 
the provision of a service … weighs against this interpretation (emphasis added) (G.(J.). 
para. 106).  
 
In reference to the rejected clause, Justice L‘Heureux-Dube, in R. v. Prosper, 1994, said that the 
―living tree‖ approach to constitutional interpretation ―has its limits‖ and ―has never been used to 
… add a provision which was specifically rejected‖ (11). However, five years later, in G.(J.), 
Chief Justice Lamer, writing for the majority, recognized that ―the omission of a positive right to 
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state-funded counsel in Section 10 … does not preclude an interpretation of Section 7 that 
imposes a positive constitutional obligation on governments to provide counsel in those cases 
when it is necessary to ensure a fair hearing‖ (para. 107). The Court acknowledged that it should 
―refrain from intruding into the legislative sphere beyond what is necessary in fashioning 
remedies for Charter violations‖ (para. 102). It found that ―the least intrusive remedy would be to 
leave the legal aid policy intact, and have the trial judge order state-funded counsel on a case-by-
case basis‖ (Ibid). Therefore, the Supreme Court was careful to ground the right to state-funded 
counsel in the particulars of the case, stating that ―the government is not under an obligation to 
provide legal aid to every parent who cannot afford a lawyer. Rather, the obligation only arises in 
circumstances where the representation of the parent is essential to ensure a fair hearing where 
the parent‘s life, liberty, or security is at stake‖ (para. 100). Thus, although there is no general 
constitutional right to state-funded counsel in civil cases, if a parent in a custody application has 
exhausted all possible avenues for obtaining state-funded legal assistance, depending on the 
seriousness of the interests at stake, the complexity of the proceedings and the parent‘s 
capabilities, the court may order state-funded counsel based on Sections 7 and 24 (1) of the 
Charter (Ibid.). 
 
 The case G.(J.) forms the basis upon which arguments are made to expand the right to 
state-funded counsel to other types of civil proceedings based on the Section 7 right to ―security 
of the person.‖ Joseph Arvay argues that a claimant should succeed in obtaining state-funded 
counsel in civil cases if the individual can establish 1) their Section 7 rights are in jeopardy, 2) 
legal representation is required for the hearing to be fair, and 3) government action is the reason 
for a hearing (2002: 37). Arvay bases his three-part G.(J.) test on the conclusion in G.(J.) that 
―when government action triggers a hearing in which the interests protected by s. 7 … are 
engaged, it is under an obligation to do whatever is required to ensure that the hearing be fair‖ 
(Ibid). With respect to part two of the test, Arvay argues that in most cases counsel is necessary 
to achieve a fair hearing because the ability to test evidence through skilled cross-examination is 
an essential aspect of a fair hearing and a skill that the ordinary citizen does not possess (38). 
However, the third part of the test poses great difficulty in expanding the right to state-funded 
counsel. 
  
 The Charter applies to situations between individuals and the state, and therefore Section 
7 interests can only be protected in proceedings involving the state. The courts have repeatedly 
refused to order state-funded counsel to ensure a fair trial in private disputes. For example, in 
P.D. v. British Columbia, 2010, the plaintiff claimed that the province‘s failure to provide state-
funded counsel or a legal aid regime that ensures ―meaningful and effective access to justice by 
women in family law proceedings‖ infringed the Section 7 right to security of the person (para. 
3). Citing G.(J.), the Supreme Court of British Columbia dismissed the claim because it was a 
private dispute not involving the state: 
 
[T]here is no readily apparent state action involved in this matter .… In G.(J.) the Court 
took significant pains to emphasize that it was the involvement of the state, in seeking to 
take custody of a child, that both grounded the remedy and affected the seriousness of the 
issues raised. Furthermore, there are a significant number of decisions, from numerous 
courts, which confirm that a private dispute cannot support a s. 7 claim (P.D., para 146).  
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However, even with state involvement, the argument to expand the right to state-funded counsel 
is restricted by the courts‘ narrow interpretation of what state action can be viewed as a violation 
of ―security of the person.‖ The Supreme Court of Canada established in Blencoe v. British 
Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000, that security of the person is restricted to 
psychological stress that state-imposed and series: 
 
Where the psychological integrity of a person is at issue, security of the person is 
restricted to ―serious state-imposed psychological stress‖… that would rise to the level of 
infringing s. 7. G.(J.) …―serious state-imposed psychological stress‖ delineate two 
requirements .… First, the psychological harm must be state imposed .… Second, the 
psychological prejudice must be serious .… Not every state action which interferes with 
the parent-child relationship will restrict a parent’s right to security of the person 
(emphasis added) (Blencoe, para. 57).  
 
In short, the courts will not likely find state involvement to violate the security of the person 
where ―the state is not directly interfering with the psychological integrity of the parent [in the 
role of] parent‖ (Blencoe, para. 81). For example, a parent may suffer significant stress and anxiety 
as a result of his or her child being sentenced to jail or killed by a police officer, but, in these 
situations, ―the state is making no pronouncement as to the parent‘s fitness or parental status, nor 
is it usurping the parental role or prying into the intimacies of the relationship‖ (Ibid). 
Accordingly, no constitutional rights of the parent are engaged. 
 
Joseph Arvay and Nicholas Bala both suggest that income assistance proceedings, 
custody and access disputes between parents, adoption proceedings, and paternity proceedings 
might jeopardize the Section 7 right to ―security of the person‖ of the child and parent and might, 
thereby, be areas to which the right to state-funded counsel could be extended. It is arguable that 
the right to state-funded counsel could be extended to adoption and paternity proceedings. As 
suggested by Bala, the parent‘s fitness or parental status comes into question during such cases, 
and the court‘s order for an adoption or change in the status of the relationship between the child 
and father involves the state (2002: 69—75). However, Arvay‘s suggestion that the right to state-
funded counsel could be extended to income assistance proceedings is based on the Supreme 
Court‘s decisions that did not form part of the decision (obiter dicta) and cases dating far back to 
1985 and 1989 (2002: 37—38). As noted in the more recent 2009 Boulter case, in Gosselin v. 
Quebec (Attorney General), the Supreme Court dismissed the claim that welfare restrictions 
violated the Section 7 ―security of the person‖ provision (7). 
 
 The argument to expand the right to state-funded counsel has also been based on the 
claim that legal aid plans discriminate on the ground of sex, since criminal cases usually get 
more legal aid funding than civil cases and more men than women face criminal charges 
(McCallum 2002: 145). That women are more likely to require civil legal aid and that there is a 
need to protect women‘s equality rights were suggested in G.(J.): 
 
[T]his case raises issues of gender equality because women, and especially single 
mothers, are disproportionately and particularly affected by child protection 
proceedings. In considering the s. 7 issues, it is thus important to ensure that the analysis 
takes into account the principles and purposes of the equality guarantee in … ensuring 
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that the law responds to the needs of those disadvantaged individuals and groups whose 
protection is at the heart of s. 15 (G.(J.), para. 113). 
 
Although legal aid programs do not explicitly deny coverage to women, according to 
Margaret McCallum, they may be held to violate women‘s equality if there is sufficient 
empirical evidence that they significantly disadvantage women as compared to men (2002: 
145—46). However, it is extremely difficult to evaluate the impact of legal aid cutbacks or lack 
of services on Canadian women, as there are no data to explain the rejection of legal aid 
applications, the specific reason for the rejection, how many of the rejected applications were 
made by women, or the impact of being rejected (New Brunswick Advisory Council on the 
Status of Women 2007: 20).  
 
 P.D. v. British Columbia highlights that in addition to the difficulty of producing 
evidence to argue for enhanced legal aid for women, the court is also reluctant to interpret the 
Charter in such a way that would interfere with the allocation of legal aid funds: ―The difficulties 
with arguing in favour of an enhanced [legal aid], both under s. 15(1) and in terms of a s. 1 
analysis, are apparent. I was referred to no authority which directly supported such relief. Cases 
such as Winnipeg (Child and Family Services) v. A.(J.), 2003 … highlight some of the 
difficulties associated with seeking to deviate from legal aid funding levels‖ (para. 153). In this 
case, the appellant claimed that her right to security was impaired because she was prevented 
from having a fair hearing, as her counsel of choice refused legal aid‘s rate. The claimant sought 
a remedy under Section 24 (1) to have the court appoint her counsel of choice for her application 
for permanent guardianship at a rate of $150 per hour compared to the legal aid rate of $48 per 
hour. The court concluded that the right to state-funded counsel did not mean the right to counsel 
of choice and that there was ―inadequate evidentiary foundation‖ for the Charter claim that ―the 
appellant was unable to obtain competent counsel or that Legal Aid policies in the appointment 
of counsel affected her case and impaired her right to a fair trial‖ (Winnipeg [Child and Family 
Services], para. 3 and 56).  
 
 The argument to expand the right to state-funded counsel has also been made on the 
claim that not providing state-funded counsel discriminates against the poor under Section 15 of 
the Charter. The success of this claim lies in recognizing poverty as an analogous ground. In 
Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), 1999, the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that an analogous ground is one based on a personal characteristic that is immutable 
or changeable only at unacceptable costs to personal identity (cited in Arvay 2002: 48). Based on 
Corbiere, Arvay argues that poverty is an analogous ground because it is a characteristic beyond 
the individual‘s own present capacity to change: 
 
[P]overty is generally not something that an individual can change of his or her own 
accord. There is ample research to support the proposition that it is the Canadian social 
and economic system that keeps many individuals in a state of poverty, not a lack of 
personal initiative on the part of the individuals. It could be argued that by ―immutable‖ 
and ―constructively immutable,‖ the Supreme Court of Canada must have meant that the 
characteristic is beyond the individual‘s own present capacity to change, and that poverty 
is such a characteristic (49, emphasis in the original). 
 
Journal of Public Policy, Administration and Law                           .Volume 2, October 2011 
 
 
49 
 
 
 
 However, in Boulter v. Nova Scotia Power Incorporation, the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal reasoned that poverty is not an analogous ground under Corbiere‘s formulation, because 
financial circumstances may change, and both the poor and the government have demonstrated a 
legitimate interest in changing the economic status of the poor: 
 
[P]overty is not a personal characteristic, under Corbiere, that is (1) ―actually immutable‖ 
or (2) ―constructively immutable‖ in that either the government ―has no legitimate 
interest in expecting us to change‖ or it ―is changeable only at unacceptable cost to 
personal identity‖ .… [F]inancial circumstances may change, and individuals may enter 
and leave poverty .… Economic status is not an indelible trait like race, national or ethnic 
origin .… As to the second test, the government has a legitimate interest, not just to 
promote affirmative action that would ameliorate the circumstances attending an 
immutable characteristic, but to eradicate that mutable characteristic of poverty itself. 
That objective is shared by those living in poverty. Ms. Boulter‘s factum says, ―Ms. 
Boulter is desperately trying to escape from poverty via her educational qualifications 
from the Community College‖ (Boulter, para. 42).  
 
As the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal suggested in the Boulter case, the courts‘ refusal to 
recognize poverty as an analogous ground can also be attributed to the understanding that 
decisions around public expenditures are the responsibility of the legislatures, and it is not in the 
courts‘ role to engage in the politics of allocating public funds: 
 
Pure wealth redistribution, that is legally directed but unconnected to Charter criteria, in 
my view occupies what Hogg describes as ―the daily fare of politics, and is best [done] 
not by judges but by elected and accountable legislative bodies‖ .… I emphasize at this 
point that I am not denying poverty as an analogous ground because it is ―political.‖ 
Political issues are constitutionally reviewable .… Rather, the claimants‘ poverty claim 
does not on its merits satisfy Corbiere‘s legal criteria for analogous grounds under s. 
15(1), and therefore the issue moves to the legislative arena (emphasis in the original) 
(Boulter, para. 43). 
 
To quote Justice Sharpe of the Ontario Court of Appeal, in Dunmore v. Ontario, ―There are 
many forms of injustice in our society, particularly those resulting from uneven distribution of 
wealth, that cannot be remedied by the courts through interpretation of the Charter and that must 
be remedied through the legislative process‖ (para. 50).  
 
 Arguments to expand the right to state-funded counsel have also been made upon the 
principle of the ―rule of law.‖ Arvay argues that the rule of law includes a constitutional right to 
court access, citing B.C.G.E.U. v. British Columbia (A.G.), 1988, in which the Supreme Court of 
Canada stated that ―the right to access to the courts is under the rule of law one of the 
foundational pillars protecting the rights and freedoms of our citizens‖ (para. 26). Arvay argues 
that access to the courts includes access to counsel, citing Chief Justice McEachern of the British 
Columbia Supreme Court, who once said that ―access to courts of justice must be effective 
access, which in practical terms means access to counsel‖ (cited in Arvay 2002: 42). The courts, 
however, do not recognize the rule of law as providing for the right to counsel. In Christie v. 
British Columbia, 2005, Christie, who provided legal services to low-income individuals who 
were ineligible for legal aid, claimed that the Social Service Tax Amendment Act (No. 2) (1993) 
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was contrary to the rule of law because the legislation, by burdening access to legal counsel, 
undermined citizens‘ access to the courts and interfered with citizens‘ effective use of the courts, 
even if it did not prevent formal access (cited in Mathen 2008: 200—201). The success of the 
case depended on the court‘s receptiveness to arguments concerning unwritten constitutional 
principles (191—204). In Christie v. British Columbia, 2005, the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal found that the unwritten constitutional principle of the rule of law was not intended by 
the constitutional framers to undermine written constitutional rights: 
 
If the rule of law constitutionally required that all legislation provide for a fair trial, s. 
11(d) and its relatively limited scope .… would be largely irrelevant because everyone 
would have the unwritten, but constitutional, right to a ―fair .… hearing‖ .… [T]he 
appellants’ conception of the unwritten constitutional principle of the rule of law would 
render many of our written constitutional rights redundant and, in doing so, undermine 
the delimitation of those rights chosen by our constitutional framers .… (emphasis in the 
original) (Christie, para. 65). 
  
 Citing the above, the Supreme Court of Canada in British Columbia (Attorney General) 
v. Christie, 2007, concluded that the rule of law does not provide a general right to counsel: "[A] 
review of the constitutional text, the jurisprudence and the history of the concept does not 
support the respondent‘s contention that there is a broad general right to legal counsel as an 
aspect of, or precondition to, the rule of law" (para. 23). As noted in P.D. v. British Columbia, 
2010, the Supreme Court‘s decision in Christie ―ruled out any ‗broad-based systemic claim to 
greater legal services based on unwritten principles‘ such as the rule of law .… [It] is not to be 
regarded as an invitation to supplant the Constitution‘s written terms‖ (para. 151). 
 
Conclusion 
Establishing a constitutional right to state-funded counsel for civil law matters has been likened 
to the journey along the Yellow Brick Road. Advocates for state-funded counsel continue to 
travel this path to improve access to justice. However, Canadian courts have been firm in their 
position that Sections 7 and 15 of the Charter and the rule of law do not create a general 
constitutional right to state-funded counsel for civil cases, and they have grounded these 
interpretations in the intentions of the Constitution‘s ―founding fathers‖ and the framers of the 
Charter. It is unlikely that this situation will change, for the jurisprudence is consistent. Indeed, 
expanding the right to state-funded counsel would create a positive constitutional obligation on 
the government to spend more on civil legal aid, something the government may not be apt to do. 
As Justice Rosenberg of the Ontario Court of Appeal once said, ―a dollar spent on legal aid is a 
dollar not available for cancer treatment, education programming or desperately needed 
infrastructure,‖ and it is the government‘s role, not the court‘s, to allocate where that dollar will 
go (cited in Rosenberg 2009: Part III, Section 2). However, the problems that state-funded 
counsel could alleviate still remain and are likely to grow. Those that are at the lowest income 
levels in society and women, for instance, may possibly require legal services for family law 
matters, yet remain affected by the lack of funding for civil legal aid. Although there is no 
general constitutional right to civil legal aid, there are other paths to improve access to justice 
beyond legal aid and a right to state-funded counsel. While beyond the scope of this article, 
suffice it to note that those working to improve access to justice must continue to explore 
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different avenues and work towards alternatives to ensure that the most vulnerable populations in 
society can also secure the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Charter. 
 
Notes 
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, available at 
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter. 
2 See a more elaborate definition of ―rule of law‖ at the web site of the Centre for Constitutional 
Studies, University of Alberta, at http://www.law.ualberta.ca/ centres/ccs/keywords/?id=53. 
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